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LEGAL SCREENS AGAINST FLIES AND MOSQUITOES (Partiil 
Ann Seidman and Robert B. Seidman (1) 
Experience elsewhere in the developing world 
several ways of using law to open the window to attract foreign 
capital, while keeping out unwanted flies and mosquitoes. 
Fi·rst, because political, economic aod social 
characteristics of country clif·ft:-?r qua 1 .i. t 2:\ t i v E'!' 1 y ·f \r om a 11 
government simply copy the laws of another 
country and expect it to produce the ~arne results. Hair·,an cannot 
copy Hong Kong's laws and expect 
Hai nar .. , can, of learn 
especially about 
development. Hainan must formulate 




not cc:or1t1.- ibut<-:? tn 
law in light of its 
own obs tacles and resources. Those obstacles and resources, of 
course, inevitably differ from those anywhere else in the world. 
Second, to avoid th£:> indiscriminate admission of foreign 
firms that may waste local resources while contributing little to 
development, many statutes create a licensing system to admit 
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I. 
only those firms which meet specified criteria. 
The fi·rst the granting a 
licE·nc e . Simply to "lis t in vague t E0r ms ( 11 irnp1rov e d 
11 in c ·r eased r:."':!cnp l oyment op po ·r tuniti e ~:; 11 , 
example), however, leaves too mu c h di s cretion to the lic e n s ing 
o·ffici .-c:1l s. Th ey may not know what t ec hnologies o r ne w jobs would 
contr i bute to dev el opment . 
by no mean s d o all new indus tries cr eate poles 
of region-wide gr o wth, st imul ati ng other investments that util iz e 
mor e local ·,r~"?~:;o ur ce ~~ , . plrovide more jobs , and living 
standards throughout an entire region. To:• play that 
private f irm must E•mploy local resources (i ncluding 
labor), or produ ce tool s , E1qu i prnen t a nd rna tE·? l' ia l s 
productivity in loc a l ind~stri es . A foreign firm th a t 0ses s uch 
sophisticated technology th at whenever a nE:~E·? d ~; 
I 
n:?pEli ·,r it 
must s h i ppE: cl by o:1i .,. tr::. Tokyo, BeY lin, Ca 1 i fol' nia 
less than a plant which can use local machine 
shops to repa ir its equipment. 
!\loy d o <:Il l hi£1h -·tec:hnolo~JY industries help Third World 
econo mi es . Us ua lly, the host country need s not high technology of 
evtrj ,~1 s•:•rt , br.1t hit;lh te c hnolo(;W of vel"Y s p<:::oci ·fic sorts. It need~;; · to 
have the trechnology s ufficiently unpacked s o that local workers 
a nd engi nee.ys l ~arn to seYvice and repaiY the machines , and how 
to design new machines usi ng th a t technology. Th e criteria in the 
"J.iCE?nsi ng law s ho.uld spr:."::>cify th e soy· t s of · t ec hncrl.o~JY requiyc~d 
from time to time , and the degree of unpack i ng trequired. 
th at , foreign firm s to 
I 
. --· . 
appropriately meet national ·l'"equi rement~~, the national plan 
sho uld specify the investments needed to advance ·the country's 
deve 1 c•pment plant of such-and-suc h a 
capacity, the exploitation of known mi ne·r a 1 resourc e, the 
introduct ion of a particular advanced technology. 
foreign inv es to rs then bid for the opportunity to const1ruct and 
run those specific enterprises. 
Some stat utes require the licensing agency to conduct a 
cost-benefit anal y sis , balancing the known costs of admit ting a 
foreign investor against the expected benefi ts. The ac;1en cy can 
eithE?·r forbid c:~ too - costly invest ment f2ntilrely, .:Hlmit a 
marginally advantageous one without granting it costly benefits, 
like unlimited use of foreign exchange , income tax concessions, 
or the · unlimited export of profits . 
1-k·w a statute ·~nsure that officials take the planned can .I 
into 
o..e.c.l>""~-b ~~ ~ra.w"..\-..".1 \,'cev.ses'. 
c:K • ·- 1 1 6 l. n ii. fiF .:q:na .t fl ~ :i: ttl ;!I e e:: il!i ::is e e 11!!! au IG? A f e 1.-J s t a t u t e s 
require them to make their decisions in writing, specifying the 
I·· 
I 
factors they considered, and the weight they gave to each. Making 
that opinion public may pro v ide a way to permit public opinion to 
influence decision-maker s . Procedures enab ling anybody affected 
to appeal the decision ma ke it more difficult for officials to 
act arbitrarily. 
l···low ciHl. the law help make sure that the foreign fiim 
fulfill s its promises? Instead of merely licensing a foreign 
f~rm to invest in the host country~ some statutes require that 
' the license include specific conditions the firm must meet, for 
workers to repair 
I ' 
r 
. - - --·~ .. ~ . 
! 
and manufacture the nE?W tec:hn.:::.logy; setting a timetable for 
employing nationais in management positions; ·using a specified 
increasing percentage of locally produced materials and parts. 
p r oblems concerns the rewards that the host 
country p a ys to induce ·fo·f e .ign p·l'ivate investment. Somt:? 
investment codes include establishing tariff barriers to protect 
the foreign investor to the detriment of local consumers; easing 
foreign e:.-; chan£~e 1restr i ction~~; permitting the payment of 
unlimited profits out of the c:ountr~; outright subsidies (usually 
the form of 
i n d us t ·,.- i a l e s t)t ''\ t e ~:; f o l' t h t? 
other concessions. 
0)' import duty relief); building 
foreign investors~ and a myriad o:•f 
How can help to ensure that the incentives the host 
country p~ovides actually induce new foreign investment, and that 
th~ amount of investment it induces bears a prudent relationship 
to the cost of the inducement to the host government? 
Shortly after independence, for hoping to induce 
new foreign inves tment, Zimbabwe relaxed the prohibition on 
foreign firms' remittance of tc• their homE• countries. 
The following year, foreign investors sent home over $lOO . million 
more in foreign exchang~ tha~ they could have under the previous 
la•,J, but they brought into the country only about $25 million ~n 
new capi ti\1. Zimbabwe lost over $75 million in foreign exchange 
as well a s in loc a lly-generated investable s urplus. 
A variety of legal devices would have enabled Zimbabwe to 
reinvest thes e funds. To ment i on only one, the government could 
have lir-1ked the fi -r·m 7 s. i;; f:)J:.TT·ty to s hip out foreign e:_: ~,;change to 
.• 1 
• 
its foreign exchange earnings. 
I~come tax exemptions constitute a way governments seekihg 
to attract foreign investment frequently lose funds to no 
pu r pose. A government that grants tax relief is really just 
paying the foreign firm a subsidy equal to the tax forgiven. 
This is particularly undesirable since, und er its home-countr~ 
tax law, the foreign firm frequently can deduct taxes 1t pays to 
the host country from the taxes it pays its home government. 
Finally,a fourth set of problefus arise: How can law help to 
keep out the really dangerous mosquitoes and flies: corruption, 
loss of inves table surplus, class formation, external dependency? 
Many states have enacted laws generally guarding against 
corruption: creating State Procurators or Ombudsmen, instituting 
meticulous accounting systems and the monitoring of expenditures 
by state banking systems, setting up special task forces of one 
sort or another, and requiring cadres to declare their assets. At 
especially vulnerable points like foreign exchange cont~ols and 
import licensing, the more precisely stated the criteria for 
public officials'actions, the mor e collegial the procedures (it 
is more difficult to bribe a group than an individual), the more 
public the decision-making · process, the less likely will 
corruption cre~p in. 
Various countries have introduced legal devices to hinder 
emergence of a comprador bourgeosie class benefitting from ties 
with foreign inve~t or s. Because of their wealth, this new 






influence in government policy-making. Tanzania and other 
countries have experimented with Leadership Codes, forbidding 
cadres from owning shares in private firms, from owning rental 
real estate, employing workers. 
Of course, the ultimate control must come from below, th~t 
is, by popular participation in decision-making. Achieving t~at 1 
requires policies and laws with a reach much wider than investol 
control laws. 
Formulating techniques tb admit desired investments while 
screening out unwanted -effects does not exceed the limits of 
law. I ·t requires, however, that law-makers direct their 
attention, not only to the task of opening the window, but to th~ 
equally important task of installing the screens. 
